Abstract -Train control system is a vital system due to controlling the speed and interlocking of train in railway. The train control system is designed by double module or triple module system as a vital system. Hardware redundancy means to use additional hardware to defect and tolerant faults. There are three forms of hardware redundancy: passive, active and hybrid. Passive redundancy architecture achieves fault tolerance by masking the faults that occur without requiring any action on the part of the system or an operator. Active redundancy architecture requires a fault to be detected before it can be tolerated. After the detection of the fault, the actions of location, containment and recovery are performed to remove the faulty component from the system. Hybrid redundancy architecture combines passive and active approaches. Fault masking is used to prevent generation of erroneous results. Fault detection, location and recovery are used to replace the faulty component with a spare component. In this paper, the architecture and reliability model are presented through the passive, active, hybrid redundancy architecture. Also, the reliability in the train control system is analyzed through changing time using Matlab program.
Introduction
Train control system is a vital system in railroad systems because of controlling train speed and routes. There are ATC(Automatic Train Control) system, IXL(Interlocking) system and CTC(Centralized Traffic Control) system [1] . Hardware systems are installed with double or triple module systems because the train control systems are essential systems. Hardware redundancy architectures are that additional hardware is used to detect faults [2] .
Currently, there are passive, active and hybrid redundancy architecture in hardware redundancy architectures. Passive redundancy architecture achieves fault tolerance by masking the faults that occur without requiring any action on the part of the system or an operator. Active redundancy architecture requires a fault to be detected before it can be tolerated. After the detection of the fault, the actions of location, containment and recovery are performed to remove the faulty component from the system. Hybrid redundancy architecture combines passive and active approaches. Fault masking is used to prevent generation of erroneous results [3] .
In this paper, reliability models are presented in the passive, active and hybrid redundancy. The reliability in the passive redundancy is analyzed in chapter two. The reliability in the active redundancy is analyzed in chapter three. The reliability in the hybrid redundancy is analyzed in chapter four. The results of simulation are presented in chapter five.
Reliability Analysis in Passive Redundancy Architecture
Voters are used to hide fault in the passive redundancy architecture. Voting by majority decision is used fundamentally. The passive redundancy using voters does not require reconstitution of systems to tolerate faults. There is TMR(Triple Modular Redundancy) in the passive redundancy architecture. Hardware of TMR systems is processors, memories and other devices for controlling train. That hardware is installed with majority modules and results are voted by using software modules to detect faults. In this thesis, TMR systems are introduced in case of one voter and three voters [4] .
TMR System using One Voter
The TMR system using one voter consists of three function modules for controlling trains and output is decided by one voter. In case that the faults in one function module for controlling trains occur, the voter is operated by majority decision to hide the faults. Fig. 1 is the structure of TMR system using one voter [5] . Fig. 1 . Structure of TMR system using one voter.
Equation (1) is the reliability of TMR system using one voter without the reliability of a voter.
Equation (2) is the reliability of a module. Equation (3) is the reliability of TMR system using one voter in case of
is the probability of fault occurrence on a function module for controlling trains. Equation (4) includes the probability of fault occurrence from (3).
λ is the probability of fault occurrence on a voter.
TMR System using Three Voters
Voters are the most difficult part in the TMR system. In case that there are faults in voters, total systems fail due to diffusing faults. SPF(Single Point of Failure) is that the failure of a element brings about the failure of total systems. As shown Fig. 2 , the voters are triple module to decrease the influence of failure on the voters. The function modules receive each a input and operate controlling trains [7] . Fig. 2 . Structure of TMR system using three voters.
Equation (5) is the reliability of TMR system using three voters by using (4).
Reliability Analysis in Active Redundancy Architecture
The active redundancy architecture allows faults by detecting, isolating and recovering faults. Generally, faults is known as errors in the active redundancy architecture because errors cause faults. In this thesis, the reliability of DC(Duplication with Comparison) system and SS(Standby Sparing) system is analyzed [8] . Fig. 3 is the structure of DC system. Outputs of function modules for controlling trains are compared in the comparison. In case that outputs are not equal, error signal occurs. The DC system detects faults about only one function module for controlling trains. Also, in case of detecting faults, there is not action to normal operation by the system [9] . Fig. 3 . Structure of DC system. Equation (6) is the reliability of DC system including the probability of fault occurrence on the comparison in case of
Duplication with Comparison System
is the probability of fault occurrence on the comparison. Fig. 4 is the structure of SS system. There are HSS(Hot Standby Sparing) and CSS(Cold Standby Sparing) in the SS system. The HSS system is used in the train control system due to vital system. The HSS system is operated by operation modules and redundancy modules. In case that faults take place, redundancy modules are operated. The CSS system is operated by one module and the other modules are not operated in the normal operation. The switch observes operation modules. In case of detecting faults, redundancy module is operated [10] . Equation (7) is the reliability of SS system which has one standby spare in case of
Standby Sparing System
ρ is the success probability of switching.
Reliability Analysis in Hybrid Redundancy Architecture
The hybrid redundancy architecture is combined by the passive and active redundancy architecture. However, the hybrid redundancy architecture requires much hardware and is complex among hardware. In this thesis, the reliability of SPR(Self-Purging Redundancy) system is analyzed [11] . Fig. 5 is the structure of SPR system. The output of the voter is the result of comparing outputs among function modules for controlling trains. In case of detecting faults, the switch of the defective module opens from the total system. Equation (8) is the reliability of SPR system which has N-function modules in case of
λ is the probability of fault occurrence on the switch.
The text must include a citation of each figure and table. Letters in the figure should be large enough to be readily legible when the drawing is reduced. Do not forget to include the label, unit for each axis and the legend when they are required.
Simulation
The reliability of train control system is analyzed by using the passive, active and hybrid redundancy architecture. Table 1 is simulation conditions [12] . The variation of the reliability according to time is estimated on the basis of Table 1 . Fig. 6 is the reliability in the passive redundancy architecture. As shown Fig. 6 , because probability of fault occurrence on the majority voter is low in the train control system, the reliability between one voter and three voters is similar. In other words, the number of the majority voter is decided by the probability of fault occurrence on the majority voter. Fig. 7 is the reliability in the active redundancy architecture. As shown Fig. 7 , the reliability of the SS system is higher than the DC system. In case that the reliability keeps 1, time is about 6 10 [hour] in the passive redundancy architecture and 5 10 [hour] in the active redundancy architecture. Fig. 8 is the reliability in the hybrid redundancy architecture. As shown Fig. 8 , The more function modules for controlling trains are, the higher reliability is. Because the hybrid redundancy architecture includes the passive and active redundancy architecture, the reliability is the highest in redundancy architectures when N is over four.
Conclusion
In this paper, the reliability is calculated by the passive, active and hybrid redundancy architecture. After calculation and analysis, conclusions were obtained.
(1) The passive redundancy architecture is based on hiding faults. As the probability of fault occurrence on the majority voter in the train control system is low, the number of the majority voter is properly decided by standard value of the reliability.
(2) The active redundancy architecture is reconstituted by detecting, isolating and recovering faults. The reliability of the SS system is higher than the DC system. The reliability in the active redundancy architecture is lower than the passive redundancy architecture about ten hours. (3) The hybrid redundancy architecture is possible to hide faults and reconstitute systems. However, the hybrid redundancy architecture is complex and cost fairly much of money. The reliability is the highest in the redundancy architectures.
The reliability of the train control system is exclusively analyzed in this thesis. When the train control system is designed, the hardware redundancy architecture is chosen by the reliability, availability, maintenance and safety.
